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Abstract
This paper investigates how group identification distorts people’s beliefs about the ability of their
peers in social groups. We find that experimentally manipulated identification with a randomly
composed group leads to overconfident beliefs about fellow group members’ performance on an
intelligence test. This result cannot be explained by individual overconfidence, i.e., participants
overconfident in their own skill believing that their group performed better because of them, as
this was ruled out by experimental design. Moreover, we find that participants with stronger
group identification put more weight on positive signals about their group when updating their
beliefs. These in-group biases in beliefs can have important economic consequences when group
membership is used to make inference about an individual’s characteristics as, for instance, in
hiring decisions.
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1 Introduction1
This paper investigates whether and how identification with a group leads to overconfident beliefs2
about the ability of other members of that group. Models of ego-utility or self-image protection3
posit that people systematically inflate ego-relevant beliefs in order to feel good about themselves4
(e.g., Be´nabou & Tirole, 2002; Ko˝szegi, 2006; Weinberg, 2009). Such motives can explain why5
individuals are on average overconfident about their personal skill or ability. We hypothesize that6
a similar effect occurs for social groups because people care about the image of the groups they7
belong to and identify with (Crocker & Luhtanen, 1990; Aberson et al., 2000; Hewstone et al.,8
2002). After all, the ego is not created in isolation, and an individual’s identity and self-image are9
decisively shaped by belonging to social groups (Tajfel & Turner, 1986).110
Biased beliefs about the abilities of different social groups are problematic whenever people11
use aggregated group-level information to make inference about the individual characteristics of12
a particular person. Models of statistical discrimination—for instance Arrow’s (1973) theory of13
discrimination in the labor market—imply that in situations of incomplete information about an14
individual’s characteristics (e.g., ability or intelligence), rational decision makers should use knowl-15
edge about the social groups that individual belongs to for updating their beliefs.2 This is optimal16
if, on average, group membership is correlated with the relevant characteristic.17
To investigate how group identification distorts beliefs about group ability, we implement a18
laboratory experiment in which we randomly assign participants to groups, manipulate identifica-19
tion with the group via group building tasks that involve outcome dependency and competition20
between groups, and measure beliefs about fellow group members’ intelligence. The experiment is21
characterized by i) the use of an incentive compatible belief elicitation mechanism that makes it22
costly to distort beliefs, ii) the exogenous manipulation of group identification, iii) the exclusion23
of the self from the reference groups about which beliefs are elicited (in order to exclude that par-24
ticipants overconfident in their own skill simply believe that their group performed better because25
of them) and iv) the repeated elicitation of beliefs after the provision of noisy information, which26
allows observing biases in belief updating over time.27
Our results show the causal link from identification with a group to overconfidence in the relative28
ability of that group. We find that participants in treatments with experimentally induced group29
identification have more favorable prior beliefs about the performance of their randomly assigned30
group members in an intelligence test than have participants in a control condition. Moreover,31
we find that group identification affects how participants process information when updating their32
1Akerlof & Kranton (2000) have integrated this insight into an economic model of identity, and there is a growing
number of empirical studies that demonstrate the general relevance of social identities for various economic domains
such as, e.g., social preferences (Ben-Ner et al., 2009; Chen & Li, 2009), coordination problems (Chen & Chen, 2011),
cooperation in social dilemmas (Goette et al., 2006; Chen et al., 2014), risk and time preferences (Benjamin et al.,
2010), or decision making in strategic environments (e.g., Le Coq et al., 2015; List et al., 2016; Rong et al., 2016).
See also Lane (2016) for a meta-analysis of experimental work on social identity in economics.
2Empirical evidence shows that group-level information is often used to make judgments and inferences about
individuals (Allport, 1954; Fiske, 1993). Moreover, people use group-level information even if information on the
individual is complete and the group-level information is redundant (Albrecht et al., 2013; Reuben et al., 2014).
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beliefs, leading people to overweight positive information about the other members of their group33
and to discount negative information (the effects for the discounting of negative information are34
only marginally significant, however). Together, these results suggest that people are motivated35
to maintain a positive image of a group they identify with and adjust their social perceptions and36
beliefs accordingly.37
Several recent experimental papers have documented belief distortions about ego-relevant per-38
sonal attributes. Eil & Rao (2011) and Mobius et al. (2014) find that people display an asymmetric39
bias when updating their beliefs about intelligence, overweighting positive information and dis-40
counting negative information.3 Their results mirror the pattern we find in this paper when people41
update their beliefs about the skills of a social group they identify with. Schwardmann & van der42
Weele (2017) show that people inflate beliefs about their own ability because it helps them bluff43
and appear more skilled to others (see also Trivers, 2011). Relatedly, Di Tella et al. (2015) find that44
people seem to systematically distort their beliefs about the altruism of others in order to justify45
selfish acts to themselves.46
Overconfidence in relative group performance has been investigated by Healy & Pate (2007).47
Their set-up differs importantly from ours as they study group overconfidence in real-existing groups48
in the lab (using campus fraternities and sororities), as well as at a scrabble tournament in the field49
(using groups of friends). Healy & Pate find that both students in the lab and scrabble players in50
the field display significant overconfidence in the relative performance of their group. Whereas the51
use of real-existing groups has its advantages (Goette et al., 2012), it can pose challenges for a clean52
identification of true overconfidence, because the experimenter lacks knowledge and control about53
the information structure and events (prior to the experiment) that led to the elicited beliefs. This54
is problematic because overconfidence can emerge as the result of rational information processing55
in environments where feedback is infrequent and signals are ambiguous (Benoˆıt & Dubra, 2011).56
Controlling the information structure subjects face is thus key in our design for ensuring a clean57
identification of true overconfidence. Moreover, unlike our study, Healy & Pate do not exclude58
the self when eliciting confidence about group-level performance, thus preventing their study from59
disentangling overconfidence in group performance from the well-documented effect of individual60
overconfidence (see Dunning et al., 1989; Merkle & Weber, 2011; Burks et al., 2013; Benoˆıt et al.,61
2015, for empirical evidence on individual overconfidence).4 Specifically, including a subject’s own62
performance in the comparisons between groups when eliciting confidence about group performance63
is likely to lead to an overestimation of the extent of overconfidence in group performance as it is64
confounded by the subject’s overconfidence in his or her own performance.65
3Several recent papers fail to find such asymmetric updating, however. Whereas the studies by Barron (2016) and
Gotthard-Real (2017) find no evidence for asymmetric updating in financial decision making domains that are not
necessarily ego-relevant, neither do the studies by Buser et al. (2016), Coutts (2018), and Schwardmann & van der
Weele (2017) for presumably ego-relevant cognitive skills.
4While investigating different research questions, also Healy & Pate (2011) and Brookins et al. (2014) find evidence
that, compared to a rational benchmark, people are on average overconfident about the relative performance of a
group they belong to. Both studies include the self in the group comparisons.
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Psychologists have long studied how motivated reasoning can lead to distorted perceptions of66
the world (see Kunda, 1990, for a review) and how group membership affects judgments about the67
members of in- and out-groups (see Hewstone et al., 2002, for a review). Despite some existing68
evidence for distortions in beliefs about the in-group’s ability (e.g., Bigler et al., 1997), psycholog-69
ical studies typically rely on non-incentivized self-report measures that do not make it costly for70
participants to distort beliefs. They do therefore not allow studying a potential bias in belief forma-71
tion in situations characterized by a trade-off between the instrumental value of beliefs and other72
(e.g., self-image) motives. Ensuring that belief distortions have negative monetary consequences73
for experimental participants is further important because previous studies have shown that results74
from non-incentivized experiments about biases in belief formation and updating do not necessar-75
ily replicate when participants have monetary incentives for thinking about and revealing their76
beliefs (e.g., Grether, 1980, 1992).5 With regard to individual overconfidence, Hoelzl & Rustichini77
(2005) find, for instance, that patterns of overconfidence in personal skill differ importantly between78
incentivized and non-incentivized treatments.79
Our paper provides new insights on the effects of group identification on beliefs about social80
groups by studying not only the static effect of group identification on beliefs but also how distor-81
tions evolve over time and how group identification affects belief updating. Moreover, our design82
addresses methodological issues present in earlier related studies. First, we form groups randomly83
and manipulate group identification exogenously. This allows perfect control over the information84
structure and ensures a clean identification of belief distortions. Second, we exclude the self from85
the reference group about which we elicit beliefs in order to avoid a confounding effect of partici-86
pants’ overconfidence in their personal skill. Third, we provide monetary rewards when measuring87
beliefs and use an incentive compatible elicitation mechanism. The monetary incentives capture88
the instrumental value of beliefs and should lead to a better measure of beliefs. The following89
section presents our experimental design in detail. Section 3 presents the results. In section 4 we90
conclude and discuss the implications of our findings.91
2 Experimental Design and Procedure92
We created an experimental set-up that allows capturing the effect of group identification on be-93
lief distortions both by comparison with a rational benchmark as well as by comparison between94
experimental conditions. The underlying characteristic about which we elicited beliefs is other95
participants’ performance on a short IQ test. Hence, our dependent variable does not capture96
beliefs about a participant’s personal performance on the quiz. Moreover, in order to observe belief97
updating, participants received partial information about group performance on the test, and we98
elicited beliefs again after each bit of information.99
5Relatedly, both Ga¨chter & Renner (2010) and Trautmann & van de Kuilen (2014) find that incentivizing belief
elicitation leads to belief measures that are more predictive of participants’ behavior, thus indicating that compared
to no incentives, incentivized methods provide a more accurate measure of participants’ actual beliefs on which they
base their decisions.
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Table 1: Characteristics of implemented experimental conditions
No group framing Group framing
No group interaction Control (C) Group Framing (GF)
(Anonymous) group interaction - Group Framing + Interaction (GF+I)
In our experimental treatments we manipulated whether a participant perceives these other100
participants to belong to the same group as herself and the extent of identification with that group.101
We compare these treatments to a control condition in which there were no groups. We describe102
our experimental set-up and the manipulations in detail below.103
2.1 Setup and Experimental Conditions104
Participants in all experimental conditions were randomly assigned to groups of four, and each105
group (the “in-group”) was matched to another group (the “out-group”). We varied to what106
extent this group assignment was made salient to participants and whether it was accompanied107
by additional group building tasks involving a limited and anonymous form of interaction between108
group members.109
The experimental design consists of three conditions that are summarized in Table 1. In the110
Control (C) condition, we made no reference to groups whatsoever. The structure of the belief111
elicitation tasks, however, was exactly the same as in the other conditions (see stage C in section 2.2112
below for details). Participants in the Group Framing (GF) condition were made aware of the group113
structure, i.e., that there were two groups and that they had been assigned to one of them (we114
referred to the groups as “your group” and “other group”). Moreover, the IQ test was also framed115
as a group task and introduced outcome dependency within the in-group as well as competition116
with the out-group: The participants took the test individually, but they earned a bonus if the total117
score of all members of their in-group was higher than the out-group’s score (see the description of118
stage B in in section 2.2 below). Finally, in the Group Framing + Interaction (GF+I) condition,119
designed to induce the highest level of group identification in our study, participants faced the same120
group framing as in GF, and additionally engaged in a number of group building tasks in which121
they interacted with the other participants in the group. We intended to structure the interaction122
in a way that it did not reveal clear information about other participants’ intelligence (see the123
description of stage A in section 2.2 and also Appendix C).124
The main goal of our treatment conditions GF+I and GF was to induce different levels of group125
identification. We intended to induce the highest level of group identification in GF+I, a lower126
level in GF and expected practically inexistent group identification in the Control condition. The127
most important comparison for testing the effects of group identification on belief distortions is thus128
the contrast between GF+I and C. The contrast between GF and C indicates whether lower levels129
of group identification induced without any interaction between group participants are enough to130
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Table 2: Timeline in the experiment
Group Framing +
Interaction (GF+I)
Group Framing
(GF)
Control
(C)
A. Group Framing 3 3 5
B. Group Interaction Manipulation 3 5 5
C. IQ Test 3 3 3
D. Elicitation of Prior Beliefs about
Group Performance
3 3 3
E. Provision of Noisy Signals about
Group Performance
3 3 3
F. Elicitation of Posterior Beliefs about
Group Performance
3 3 3
G. Elicitation of Beliefs about Individ-
ual Performance
3 3 3
H. Manipulation Check 3 3 3
Notes: The table lists the stages of the experiment in chronological order, as they were presented to participants.
Note that in the GF+I condition, the IQ test (stage C) was chronologically integrated into the group interaction
manipulation (stage B). In all conditions, stages E (noisy signals) and F (posterior beliefs) were repeated three
times, with a posterior belief elicited after each of the three signals.
trigger biases in belief formation. Importantly, our design allows for beliefs in C to differ from131
an unbiased rational benchmark simply because of cognitive limitations (e.g., with regard to the132
understanding of the belief elicitation mechanism) or general probability distortions. By comparing133
beliefs in GF+I and GF with beliefs in C, we control for these other sources of belief distortions.134
Finally, the contrast between GF+I and GF allows isolating the effect of our group building tasks135
that involved anonymous interaction between participants.136
2.2 Stages in the Experiment137
For each stage, participants received detailed written instructions and, when appropriate, answered138
control questions to ensure that they had read and understood the instructions. Appendix H139
provides a translation of the instructions. Earnings were expressed in Monetary Units (MU) that140
were exchanged into Swiss Francs (CHF) at a rate of 5 MU to 1 CHF. In the following, we provide a141
detailed description of the different stages of the experiment and the temporal flow. Table 2 provides142
an overview. Stages A (group framing) and B (group interaction manipulation) were unique to the143
GF respectively the GF+I condition, all other stages were common to all experimental conditions.144
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A. Group Framing (GF and GF+I Only)145
Participants in GF and GF+I were explicitly informed that they had been assigned to groups of146
four and that these groups would remain constant throughout the experiment.147
B. Group Interaction Manipulation (GF+I Only)148
Participants in GF+I performed a first task that consisted of designing the flag that would represent149
the group during the experiment. Participants found envelopes on their desks containing colored150
paper (each group had a different color: red, blue, green or yellow) and scissors. They individually151
cut out a shape of their choice and put it back in the envelope. The experimenter collected the152
envelopes after four minutes and an assistant outside the room pasted each of the four shapes into153
the corners of a white paper and photographed the resulting flags. In the meantime, participants154
read instructions for the next part. We uploaded pictures of the flags into the system and in all155
remaining stages of the experiment, participants could see their in-group’s and out-group’s flags at156
the top of their screens.157
Next, participants played an interactive game that consisted of reducing the size of a colored158
circle displayed on the screen by clicking on it. The color of the circle coincided with the color that159
represented the out-group. All members of the group could contribute to reducing the size of the160
circle by clicking as fast as they could. The task was presented as a competition with the other161
group: after 30 seconds, the group with the smallest circle would win a reward of 10 MUs. Ties162
were broken randomly. Participants never saw the other group’s circle, nor were they informed of163
the outcome of the game until the very end of the experiment.6164
After the first clicking game, participants completed the IQ test (see stage C below).165
The final task was another competitive game that consisted of enlarging the size of a circle166
by clicking on it. The color of the circle coincided this time with the color that represented the167
in-group. In order to make the task slightly more interesting, this time the circle was moving168
around on the screen. All members of the group could enlarge the size of the circle by clicking169
on it. After 30 seconds, the group with the biggest circle would win a reward of 10 MUs. Again,170
participants received no feedback about the outcome of this game and they could not see the out-171
group’s circle. The main goal of the circle tasks was to create group identification via competition172
and the experience of working together in reducing or increasing the size of the circle.173
The group interaction tasks in GF+I were inspired by the Robbers Cave experiment (Sherif174
et al., 1961). In this field study, conducted at a summer camp, researchers randomly assigned175
boys to two groups and made them engage in activities aimed at enhancing identification with176
these groups. Competitive games and the creation of flags were important elements of the identity-177
building activities. For the purposes of our study, we tried to take these elements to the laboratory178
in a way that sustained the anonymity of participants and that provided no clear cues about the179
6One may argue that if participants observe the circle reduce “quickly,” they could infer that their teammates are
putting high effort in the task and could therefore expect them to put high effort in the IQ test as well. However,
the clicking task was easy by design: for any positive effort level, the circles reduced quickly. Moreover, GF serves
as a robustness check; participants in that condition stated overconfident beliefs even though they did not play the
circle task (see results in section 3).
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actual intelligence of the other participants in the in- or the out-group (see also Appendix C).180
We thus designed the group manipulation tasks in GF+I in a way that avoided any meaningful181
interaction between participants, thus preventing them form inferring their fellow group members’182
intelligence at this stage (as it would have been likely, e.g., had we used a manipulation involving183
a group chat like Chen & Li, 2009). Importantly, no communication between participants took184
place during the group manipulation stage, and participants were forbidden to talk with other185
participants during the entire duration of the experiment.186
C. IQ Test (All Conditions)187
All participants completed an IQ test divided into three sections of eight questions each. The188
questions came from Cattell (1940)’s culture-free test, and they consisted mostly of finding the189
image that would fit a certain pattern. One point was added per correct answer to the individual190
score. Participants had 90 seconds per section to answer as many questions as possible.7191
To strengthen group identification in GF+I and GF further, the payoffs of this task were192
determined at the group level. This reflects a feature of many relevant groups in real life, in193
which people depend on each other’s performance or ability (we discuss this point in more detail194
in section 2.3 below). Participants in GF+I and GF thus received a reward of 10 MUs if their195
in-group’s score (the sum of the four members’ individual scores) was higher than the out-group’s.196
In the Control condition, participants received the reward if their individual score situated them197
within the top 50% of all participants in the session. In all conditions, ties were broken randomly.198
Importantly, tests were taken individually and there was no interaction or cooperation during the199
IQ test stage between participants in any of the experimental conditions. Moreover, participants200
received no feedback about individual nor group scores until the very end of the experiment. The201
scores from the IQ test are our measures of individual intelligence and the sum of individual scores202
are our measures of group intelligence. In the following stages of the experiment, we elicited beliefs203
about group intelligence.204
D. Elicitation of Prior Beliefs about Group Performance (All Conditions)205
In all conditions, subjects were asked to compare the performance in the IQ test of two groups206
of three participants each. For participants in GF+I and GF, we used the previously introduced207
group framing and asked participants to state the probability that the other three members of their208
in-group scored better than three (randomly selected) members of the out-group.8 For participants209
in C, in contrast, we used a neutral framing and asked them to compare the score of three randomly210
selected participants (whom we referred to neutrally as “X, Y, and Z”) in the session with the score211
of three other randomly selected participants (“A, B, and C”) in the same session. Notice that the212
comparison participants make in C is equivalent to the one in GF+I and GF, considering that we213
7The average number of correct answers in the IQ test was 12.4 out of 24, with a minimum of 6, a maximum of 20,
and a standard deviation of 2.5. At the level of the groups of three participants whose scores were compared in the
belief elicitation stages, the average group-score was 37.2 with a minimum of 26, a maximum of 51, and a standard
deviation of 4.7. Ties in the overall group scores occurred in 2 out of 96 cases. There was thus enough variance
between individuals and groups on the intelligence measure for meaningful comparisons.
8The comparison with three members of the out-group keeps the size of the reference groups constant.
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formed groups randomly and that no interaction that could reveal anything about the fellow group214
members’ intelligence took place before the belief elicitation.215
To elicit beliefs we implemented a mechanism based on reservation probabilities (Karni, 2009).9216
We presented two mutually exclusive options to participants: a “lottery” and a “tournament”. By217
playing the lottery, participants could earn a reward of 10 MU with probability µ%. By playing218
the tournament, participants could earn the same reward if their in-group scored higher than the219
out-group in the IQ test. Their task was to state a value µ above which they preferred to play the220
lottery rather than the tournament. A random number y ∈ [0, 100] was drawn and participants221
received the reward with probability y% if µ ≤ y, else they received the reward if their in-group222
scored better than the out-group. They did not get information about realized earnings until the223
end of the experiment. In Appendix B we provide a more detailed discussion of the implications of224
the belief elicitation mechanism on participants’ monetary incentives in the experiment.225
The value µ is our variable of interest and corresponds to a participant’s subjective probability226
that the in-group scored higher than the out-group. An unbiased prior should be µ0 = 50% for227
two reasons. First, we formed groups randomly, which implies that the more intelligent individuals228
have the same probability to be in either group. Second, we excluded the self from the reference229
group, which implies that individuals cannot extrapolate their knowledge about their individual IQ230
to the in-group.10231
Importantly, to ensure that participants correctly understood the belief elicitation mechanism232
and the consequences of their decisions, they answered a series of control questions that involved233
the computation of payoffs of this stage given different decision and case scenarios. Participants234
could not start until they, and all other participants, had correctly answered all control questions.235
E. Noisy Signals about Group Performance (All Conditions)236
Directly after eliciting prior beliefs µ0, we showed participants three binary signals about actual237
group performance on the IQ test and we elicited posterior beliefs, µ1, µ2 and µ3, after each one of238
them (see stage F below). The computer constructed signals by randomly selecting three questions239
from the IQ test (without replacement) and comparing groups’ scores on these three questions. A240
positive (negative) signal meant that the in-group scored higher (lower) than the out-group on the241
selected questions. Ties were broken randomly, and we informed participants in the instructions242
about the tie-breaking procedure. In this design a positive signal for one group implies a negative243
signal for another group in the same session, and the number of positive signals thus equals the244
number of negative signals in each session and in all experimental conditions.245
Notice that the random assignment of participants to groups makes it likely that we observe a246
large number of ties,11 which means that the signals are not very informative. This is an interesting247
9This belief-elicitation method is similiar in spirit to the multiple price-list approach by Becker et al. (1964) that
is frequently used to elicit reservation prices in experiments. Ducharme & Donnell (1973), Allen (1987), and Holt
(2007) have proposed variants of the same approach. Schlag et al. (2015) provide a more detailed discussion and a
comparison to other belief elicitation mechanisms.
10Appendix C provides evidence that participants in GF+I could not infer relative performance of their in-group
in the IQ test from the tasks they performed in the group manipulation stage.
11Ties occurred in 66 out of 288 score comparisons in the three periods. Table A2 in Appendix A shows the
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case, however, because also in many real-life settings, e.g., on the labor market, the signals decision248
makers observe with regard to the underlying qualities and skills of members of certain social groups249
are often very noisy and hard to interpret. In fact, our set-up mirrors a situation in which there250
are no actual differences in performance between groups on average to be expected (because of251
the random assignment of individuals to groups). The experiment thus tests whether even in such252
situations, distorted beliefs about groups may emerge when individuals identify with a group.253
F. Elicitation of Posterior Beliefs about Group Performance (All Conditions)254
After each signal, we elicited posterior beliefs (µ1, µ2, µ3) using the same mechanism as for the255
elicitation of prior beliefs in stage D. There was no additional waiting time induced before the signals256
were presented and posterior beliefs were elicited. The experiment proceeded with the presentation257
of the first (respectively next) signal as soon as all participants in a session had entered their beliefs.258
G. Elicitation of Beliefs about Individual Performance (All Conditions)259
In this last stage of the experiment, using the same mechanism as in stage C, we elicited participants’260
beliefs about the probability that they obtained an individual IQ score that placed them among261
the top-half of all participants in the session. Appendix D shows that beliefs about individual262
performance were not significantly correlated with beliefs about group performance.12263
H. Manipulation Check (All Conditions)264
After collecting all incentivized measures on beliefs, in the post-experimental questionnaire we also265
implemented a one-item self-report manipulation check measuring participants’ group identification.266
We used the same wording as Chen & Li (2009). In the GF+I and GF conditions, the question was:267
“On a scale from 1 to 10, please rate how closely attached you felt to your own group throughout268
the experiment.” For the Control condition, where we did not make reference to groups, but269
participants reported their beliefs about whether the randomly selected participants “X, Y, and270
Z” performed better than three other randomly selected participants (“A, B, and C”), we adapted271
the question accordingly: “On a scale from 1 to 10, please rate how closely attached you felt to the272
participants X, Y and Z throughout the experiment.”13273
number of ties per period and condition, with associated p-values from t-tests. The Table shows evidence that ties
were balanced across conditions, except in period 3 in which ties in GF+I were twice as frequent as in C.
12Participants in GF+I completed three more stages after the elicitation of beliefs: a hiring stage, in which they
could “hire” a (random) member of the in- or the out-group (and were paid according to that member’s IQ score); a
stage in which we elicited beliefs about the relative performance of the remaining two (“neutral”) groups in the session
(intended originally to be a within-subject control condition); and a willingness-to-pay stage where participants could
buy information about the relative performance of their in-group and/or their individual relative performance. We
abandoned the within design, and with it the additional stages, because of concerns about order effects. Importantly,
the additional stages in GF+I came only after stages C and D, in which we elicited the beliefs reported here.
13Note that as the manipulation check occurred at the very end of each session, the three additional stages that
participants in the GF+I condition completed might be potentially problematic for the comparability of the manip-
ulation check data from GF+I with the other conditions. We therefore only rely on the manipulation check data
as additional evidence. However, we believe that if anything the additional stages were likely to weaken the group
identification measured in the manipulation check in GF+I, as they increased the time elapsed between the group
identification manipulation and the measure.
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2.3 Discussion of the Experimental Design274
Some elements of our experimental design and manipulations merit a specific emphasis and discus-275
sion. First, in the GF and GF+I treatments the participants’ payoffs depended on group perfor-276
mance, whereas in the Control condition, they were determined by individual performance. This277
creates an outcome dependency, which has been previously used as a group identification manipu-278
lation (Charness et al., 2007). Outcome dependency is a feature of many relevant social groups. An279
important example are work teams, where outcomes and thus payoffs typically depend on group280
performance and can often not be linked to individual performance. In fact, in any (business281
or other) organization a certain outcome dependency between members exists, as all members of282
an organization benefit if the organization performs well, even if the individual contributions to283
organizational performance may differ. Moreover, statistical discrimination can lead to outcome284
dependency for members of a social group, e.g., with regard to their labor market outcomes. If285
decision makers use group membership to form—even in an unbiased fashion—beliefs about the286
skills of an individual, the outcome of one member of the group will be correlated with that of other287
members of the same group (see, e.g., Coate & Loury, 1993). Thus, outcome dependency may occur288
in social groups even if the members are not linked by membership to a formal organization.289
Second, competitive elements (present mainly in the circle clicking tasks but also in the IQ290
test) were part of our manipulations designed to increase group identification. We implemented291
competition as an element of our group manipulation, because the existing literature indicates that292
competition between groups leads to a higher salience of groups as a source of social identification293
(e.g., Campbell, 1965; Tajfel, 1982) which increases group identification (e.g., Friedkin & Simpson,294
1985; Eifert et al., 2010) and can lead to belief distortions in the form of prejudice (e.g., Allport,295
1954; Esses et al., 2005).296
Thus, our group identification manipulations in GF+I and GF consist of different elements (in297
particular, group building through interaction and “working together” in the the flag and circle298
clicking tasks, and outcome dependency and competition in the circle clicking and IQ tasks) that299
work together to increase group identification. The goal of our study was not to test the causal300
effect of each of these tasks individually. Instead, we wanted to test the effects of identification with301
a group on beliefs about that group. To do so, we needed to have a group manipulation that was302
strong enough to affect group identification in an anonymous laboratory setting without any real303
interaction between participants. This is why we opted for a combination of the different elements304
we used.305
2.4 Data Collection306
We ran 12 sessions (4 per condition) with 16 participants each, yielding a total of 192 participants307
(46% women). We recruited participants from the subject pool for behavioral experiments at the308
University of Lausanne, Switzerland, using ORSEE (Greiner, 2015), and assuring that each subject309
participated only once. The subject pool includes undergraduates from all disciplines and we did310
not specify any exclusion restrictions. At the beginning of each session, participants signed a311
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consent form in line with the requirements of the university’s Ethics Committee. Interactions in312
the laboratory were anonymous and computerized using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007).313
Sessions lasted on average roughly for an hour (with sessions in the C and GF treatments being314
closer to 55 minutes and sessions in the GF+I treatment being closer to 65 minutes). Participants315
earned on average 20.10 CHF (including a show-up fee of 8 CHF). Participants received their316
payments in cash. We ran sessions from May to October 2013 (GF+I and C), and in November317
2014 (GF).318
3 Results319
3.1 Manipulation Check320
The answers to the self-report manipulation check question at the end of the experiment confirm321
that participants identified themselves more with their group in GF+I and GF than in C. The mean322
identification in GF+I was 5.45 (on a 1-10 scale) whereas it was 3.47 in C, which is significantly323
lower (t(126) = 4.13, p < .001).14 In GF the average was 4.80, which is also significantly higher324
than in C (t(126) = 2.81, p = .006), but not significantly lower than in GF+I (t(126) = 1.41,325
p = .161).15326
In Appendix G we use this group identification measure as main explanatory variable for prior327
and posterior beliefs in an instrumental variable specification. The IV specification has some caveats328
that we discuss in that Appendix, but it provides a robustness check for the results we report in329
the remainder of this section.330
3.2 Prior Beliefs331
On average, participants in C reported a prior belief of 54.92%. In the GF condition, the average332
reported prior was 60.81%, which is significantly different from C (t(126) = 2.30, p = .023). The333
average reported prior in GF+I was 60.56%, which is also significantly different from C (t(126) =334
2.33, p = .022).335
Figure 1 plots the empirical cumulative distribution functions of prior beliefs (µ0) by condition.336
Beliefs in GF+I present a flatter distribution of priors than beliefs in C (two-sample Kolmogorov-337
Smirnov test for equality of distributions: p = .018), which means that the average prior belief338
is higher in GF+I than in C. In particular, the median in C coincides with the unbiased prior of339
50%, as the cumulative distribution function crosses 0.5 at a prior of 50%. The median prior in340
14Test statistics and p-values from two-sample t-tests with equal variances. All p-values reported in this paper are
for two-tailed tests.
15Lane’s (2016) meta-analysis finds no significant effect of group building exercises (such as in GF+I) when com-
pared to minimal group manipulations without any group building stage.Our manipulation check data are consistent
with this result. Moreover, Zaunbrecher et al. (2017) tested the effects of two separate elements of our GF+I ma-
nipulations (the circle tasks and the flag building) on social preferences towards in- and out-groups in isolation, and
find no significant difference compared to a minimal group condition. However, as we will see, we did find different
belief updating patterns in GF+I compared to GF, which may indicate that the group identification fades out faster
in GF than in GF+I.
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Figure 1: Empirical cumulative distribution functions of prior beliefs by condition.
The Figure plots the empirical cumulative distribution function of participants’ prior beliefs (µ0) about the probability
that the in-group scored higher than the out-group on the IQ test. Two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests for equality
of distributions reject that priors in the group framing + interaction and control condition are the same (p = .018)
and that priors in the group framing and control condition are the same (p = .047).
GF+I is 60%. Interestingly, the empirical distribution of prior beliefs in GF is also flatter than the341
distribution of priors in C (p = .047), which suggests that group framing is sufficient to create a342
sense of group belonging that favors the distortion of prior beliefs. The distributions of prior beliefs343
in GF+I and GF are not significantly different (p = .677). Taken together, this is first evidence344
that beliefs are distorted in an in-group enhancing way.345
Table 3 provides regression results that confirm this interpretation. Column 1 reports a simple346
specification without control variables: the means of the prior beliefs in GF+I (p = .021) and347
GF (p = .022) are significantly higher than in C.16 There is no significant difference in average348
priors between GF+I and GF (p = .922). In column 2 we report estimates of a model that349
includes as control variables the individual IQ score (standardized), gender with a dummy for350
female participants, age in years and a measure of risk aversion. The risk aversion measure is a351
self-reported level of risk aversion collected in the post-experimental questionnaire using the item352
suggested by Dohmen et al. (2011). The original variable is integer and ranges from 0 (totally353
risk-loving) to 10 (totally risk-averse), but we used the standardized version in the regressions.354
16We do not cluster standard errors at the group level in the regressions reported in this section because all decisions
were made individually and at no point participants received any relevant information about other participants’
decisions or characteristics. This is also the case in GF+I, as the group manipulation tasks did not reveal any
meaningful information about the other members of the in- or out-group. See section C of the Appendix for a more
detailed discussion of the appropriate level of clustering. Nevertheless, Appendix F reproduces the main regression
analyses but reporting standard errors clustered by group. All our main results are robust to clustering at the group
level.
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Table A1 in Appendix A provides descriptive statistics of these variables for each experimental355
condition. The treatment effects estimated are robust to adding these variables, and the control356
variables’ coefficients are all insignificant.357
Table 3: OLS regressions for µ0
(1) (2)
GF+I 5.641** 5.700**
(2.424) (2.441)
GF 5.891** 5.803**
(2.560) (2.540)
female 2.457
(2.113)
age 0.399
(0.955)
IQ score 0.354
(1.134)
risk aversion 0.888
(0.991)
Constant 54.922*** 53.793***
(1.728) (2.124)
Observations 192 192
R2 0.036 0.047
Notes: *** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.10. Robust
SE in parentheses.
GF+I=1 if participant in GF+I condi-
tion; GF=1 if participant in GF condition;
GF+I=GF=0 if participant in C condition.
Age and IQ score standardized.
Risk aversion standardized based on self-
reported 0-10 scale.
We argue that prior beliefs in GF+I and GF are higher than in C because participants identify358
more strongly with fellow in-group members in these conditions. One might think, however, that a359
potential confound in this interpretation is that participants’ incentives for performance in the IQ360
test are not identical in the control and the other two conditions. Whereas participants in C are361
rewarded according to their individual relative performance, participants in the other conditions362
are rewarded according to their groups’ relative performance. If people have to exert effort in363
attaining scores, one might argue that the observed prior beliefs represent beliefs about higher364
effort contributed in group contests, rather than overconfidence in the in-group’s ability. Whereas365
the actual performance in the IQ test does not support this interpretation (average IQ scores are366
12.4, 12.2 and 12.6 in C, GF, and GF+I respectively, with no statistically significant differences),367
we cannot be sure that participants’ beliefs about others’ performance correspond to others’ actual368
performance. However, if people do expect performance to be higher in group contests, they should369
13
45
47
.5
50
52
.5
55
57
.5
60
62
.5
Av
er
ag
e 
be
lie
f (i
n %
)
 
µ0 µ1 µ2 µ3
 
GF+I
GF
C
Figure 2: Dynamics of beliefs by condition
The Figure plots average beliefs about the probability that the in-group scored higher than the out-group in the IQ
test before and after the realisation of the signals. µ0 is the prior belief and µt is the posterior belief reported after
the realisation of the t-th signal.
expect the same “extra effort” from both the in- and the out-group, which would then not translate370
into a prior in-group bias. Because expecting the out-group to provide the same extra effort as the371
in-group might require a higher level of reasoning, and because the level of reasoning should be372
correlated with a participant’s score in the IQ test, we can try to test for the severity of this problem373
by analyzing whether the bias in prior beliefs that we find for the GF and the GF+I treatment374
is comparable for high and low IQ participants. Indeed, based on regression analyses (reported in375
Table A3 in Appendix A), in which we interact participants’ IQ scores with the treatment dummies,376
we find that the bias in prior beliefs does not depend on participants’ scores in the IQ test. This377
indicates that the treatment effects are unlikely to be driven by beliefs about other’s effort.378
3.3 Posterior Beliefs and Information Processing379
Figure 2 displays the dynamics of average beliefs as participants incorporate the information from380
the signals they receive into their posterior beliefs. Remember that by design there is an equal381
number of positive and negative signals in all experimental conditions (because a positive signal for382
one group implies a negative signal for another group). The Figure shows that the average posterior383
belief in GF+I is always above those in the other two conditions. Moreover, it remains above 50%384
until the elicitation of the third and last posterior. In C, in contrast, the beliefs fluctuate somewhat385
randomly around the average rational benchmark of 50%.17386
The beliefs of participants in GF converge almost linearly to the posteriors of control partici-387
17Note that in Figure 2 we do not show standard error bars. The reason is that standard errors necessarily
grow bigger over time as participants receive more information, because members of successful groups (who receive
positive signals) become more confident and members of unsuccessful groups (who receive negative signals) become
less confident with more information.
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pants. Thus, whereas the group framing is effective in generating a biased prior, the effect of group388
framing in GF seems to disappear much faster than the effect of the group manipulation tasks in389
GF+I (see Chen & Li, 2009, for a similar pattern).390
In the following, we provide an econometric analysis of belief updating in response to “good”391
and “bad” signals. After the elicitation of prior beliefs, participants received three binary signals392
about the relative performance of their in-group. Signals were constructed as follows. We randomly393
drew (without replacement) three questions from the IQ test, and summed the number of correct394
answers to these three questions for each participant. We then aggregated the score of the three395
participants in each group and compared the aggregate scores of the two groups. A signal in period396
t is good (st = G) if the in-group scored higher in the 3 randomly selected questions, otherwise the397
signal is bad (st = B).398
We estimate the following regression model:399
µ˜it = α
B
0 s
B
it + α
G
0 s
G
it + β0µ˜i,t−1 +
(αB1 s
B
it + α
G
1 s
G
it + β1µ˜i,t−1)×GF + Ii +
(αB2 s
B
it + α
G
2 s
G
it + β2µ˜i,t−1)×GFi + it (1)
for t ≥ 1, where µ˜it ≡ ln( µit1−µit ). µit is participant i’s posterior belief in period t after receiving400
either a good (sGit) or a bad signal (s
B
it ).
18 Given that signals are informative, sG is always positive401
(or zero) and sB is always negative (or zero). Therefore, a bad signal enters negatively in equation402
(1) and hence a positive coefficient αB implies a decrease of posterior beliefs. Similarly, a good403
signal enters positively in equation (1) and hence a positive coefficient αG implies an increase of404
posterior beliefs. We allow all coefficients to differ between conditions according to the indicators405
GF+Ii = 1 if participant i is in the GF+I condition, GFi = 1 if she is in GF, and GF+Ii = GFi = 0406
if she is in C.407
The effect of the GF+I treatment on beliefs is given by408
E[µ˜it|GF + Ii = 1]− E[µ˜it|GF + Ii = 0, GFi = 0] = αB1 sBit + αG1 sGit + β1µ˜i,t−1 (2)
And the effect of the GF treatment on beliefs is given by409
E[µ˜it|GFi = 1]− E[µ˜it|GF + Ii = 0, GFi = 0] = αB2 sBit + αG2 sGit + β2µ˜i,t−1 (3)
We are interested in the difference in information processing between conditions, rather than410
deviations from Bayesian updating. Thus, our main focus is on the significance of the coefficients in411
(2) and (3).19 Specifically, the difference in posteriors between the GF+I and the Control condition412
18Note that sGit = ln
pt
1−pt1(sit = G) and s
B
it = ln
1−pt
pt
1(sit = B), where pt is the informativeness of the signal and
1(st = S) is an indicator that takes value one if the signal is S. See Appendix E for a detailed derivation of regression
equation (1).
19The presence of individual effects in the errors will render the OLS estimated coefficient β0 biased and inconsistent.
No inference will be made about this coefficient. Nevertheless, our parameters of interest are consistent due to
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Table 4: Interpretation of parameters
Control (C) Group Framing + Interaction (GF+I)
Perfect Bayesian updating αG0 = α
B
0 = 1 α
G
0 + α
G
1 = α
B
0 + α
B
1 = 1
Conservative updating αG0 , α
B
0 < 1 (α
G
0 + α
G
1 ), (α
B
0 + α
B
1 ) < 1
Asymmetric updating αG0 > α
B
0 α
G
0 + α
G
1 > α
B
0 + α
B
1
No in-group bias in updating αG1 , α
B
1 = 0
Note: The interpretation of parameters in the Group Framing condition (GF) is analogous to the
reported Group Framing + Interaction column by replacing the subscript 1 by 2.
after a good signal is equal to αG1 and the difference in posteriors between the two conditions after413
a bad signal is equal to αB1 . Despite focusing on treatment differences in our analyses, model (1)414
also allows us to gain insights into the belief updating process: if α < 1 participants are updating415
conservatively with respect to the rational Bayesian prescription, whereas if αG 6= αB they give416
different weight to good and bad signals and update asymmetrically (Mobius et al., 2014). Table417
4 provides guidance to interpret the parameters in model (1): if the updating process is perfectly418
Bayesian, all parameters α and β should be equal to 1 (see Appendix E for more details).419
Column 1 of Table 5 presents the OLS estimates of a pooled version of model (1) that does420
not separate the effects by condition. Overall, participants are in line with Bayesian updating and421
incorporate information correctly: both good and bad signals are considered with equal strength422
and the estimated α0-coefficients are close to one (p = .829 for α
G
0 6= 1 and p = .697 for αB0 6= 1 in423
the pooled model). When we include control variables, estimates in column 2 change slightly, but424
they are still statistically equal to one (p = .510 for αG0 6= 1 and p = .286 for αB0 6= 1).425
The picture is more interesting when looking at column 3, which reports estimates of the inter-426
acted model (1). Participants in GF+I update differently than control participants: participants in427
GF+I react significantly more to positive and marginally significantly less to negative information428
than control participants do, that is αG1 > 0 (p = .040) and α
B
1 < 0 (p = .085). Moreover, we429
also find marginally significant evidence of asymmetric updating of beliefs within GF+I by itself:430
participants in this condition put more weight on positive signals about the group than they put431
on negative signals (αG0 + α
G
1 > α
B
0 + α
B
1 , p = .088).
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432
In column 4 we include control variables to the interacted specification. The reaction of partici-433
pants in GF+I to good signals is robust to this specification: αG1 is marginally significant (p = .050).434
However, they no longer react to bad signals differently from participants in C: αB1 is not significant435
(p = .174). There is still statistically significant evidence that participants in GF+I update beliefs436
exogenous assignment to conditions and exogeneity of signals.
20In the Control condition, our data suggest a reverse asymmetry (αG0 < α
B
0 , p = .048 based on column 3 estimates
from Table 5). Baumeister et al. (2001) argue that, without the updating process being ego-relevant in some way, a
general perceptual principle applies according to which negative information looms larger in the human mind than
positive information. However, this asymmetry in the Control condition becomes statistically non-significant when
adding control variables (p = .228 based on column 4 estimates from Table 5).
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asymmetrically (αG0 + α
G
1 > α
B
0 + α
B
1 , p = .042).437
Table 5: OLS regressions for µ˜it ≡ ln[µit/(1− µit)]
(1) (2) (3) (4)
αG0 : Good signal 1.047*** 1.139*** 0.455 0.595*
(0.217) (0.211) (0.330) (0.318)
αB0 : Bad signal 0.927*** 0.783*** 1.409*** 1.148***
(0.188) (0.203) (0.404) (0.403)
β0: Lagged belief 0.382*** 0.363*** 0.372*** 0.343***
(0.108) (0.109) (0.112) (0.106)
αG1 : Good signal × GF+I 0.918** 0.832**
(0.443) (0.421)
αB1 : Bad signal × GF+I -0.827* -0.653
(0.477) (0.479)
β1: Lagged belief 0.021 0.040
(0.236) (0.233)
αG2 : Good signal × GF 0.854 0.827
(0.649) (0.645)
αB2 : Bad signal × GF -0.593 -0.424
(0.540) (0.553)
β2: Lagged belief -0.039 -0.012
(0.239) (0.240)
female -0.097 -0.108
(0.104) (0.106)
age -0.099** -0.079
(0.046) (0.049)
IQ score 0.003 0.001
(0.043) (0.043)
risk aversion 0.122*** 0.104**
(0.046) (0.044)
Observations 489 489 489 489
Participants 173 173 173 173
R2 0.212 0.226 0.227 0.237
Notes: *** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.10. SE clustered by participant in parentheses.
Observations with extreme current or lagged beliefs are dropped from the estimations
because µ˜ is not defined when µ = 0 or µ = 1.
age, IQ score and risk aversion standardized based on original scales.
When focusing on beliefs in GF, the estimates reported in column (3) of Table 5 suggest that438
there is a slight asymmetry in the updating process, as participants in GF tend to react more to439
good signals than to bad signals. However, these effects are not statistically significant (p = .190440
for αG2 and p = .274 for α
B
2 ) which implies that participants in GF do not update differently than441
participants in C. This suggests that group framing leads to overconfidence in priors that does not442
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survive belief updating, whereas the stronger group identification in GF+I renders overconfidence443
persistent.21444
When adding control variables in column 4, we arrive at similar conclusions regarding updating445
of participants in the GF condition. The tests on the α2 coefficients of the GF condition are446
similar to the ones reported in the previous paragraph (αG2 > 0, p = .202; α
B
2 > 0, p = .444; and447
αG0 + α
G
2 > α
B
0 + α
B
2 , p = .229).448
The fact that participants in GF+I interpret good signals as being more informative about449
in-group performance than bad signals, may explain the observed persistence of the prior in-group450
bias. To test this channel, we performed the following thought experiment: given the observed451
priors, what would be the (counterfactual) posteriors of participants in GF+I if they processed452
information in the same way as participants in C? To answer this question, we simply set to zero453
the coefficients with subscript 1 and 2 in model (1) and predict beliefs using the estimates in column454
2 of Table 5. Figure 3 shows that without any in-group bias in information processing, beliefs of455
participants in GF+I would rapidly converge to those of participants in C.456
4 Discussion and Conclusion457
In this paper we study how identification with a group leads to overconfident beliefs in the relative458
ability of that group. We randomly assigned participants to an anonymous four-person group, their459
“in-group” that was matched to an “out-group”, and experimentally manipulated the intensity of460
group identification. We elicited participants’ beliefs about the probability that their fellow in-group461
members performed better on an intelligence test than the out-group using an incentive-compatible462
mechanism that rewards truth-telling and accuracy of beliefs. Crucially, the design excludes the self463
from the reference group, which prevents individually overconfident participants—who are simply464
overconfident in their own skill—from believing that their group performed better because of them.465
We further explored how participants updated their beliefs by revealing partial information about466
the groups’ relative performance.467
We find evidence of, i) a “prior in-group bias”, as participants in GF+I and GF are initially468
more confident about their in-group’s relative performance than are participants in C; and ii) a469
“dynamic in-group bias”, as participants in GF+I do not process information about the true ability470
of their fellow in-group members the same way as control participants do. Specifically, they put471
more weight on positive information about the group and (marginally significantly) less weight472
21On the one hand, the theory of “confirmation bias” predicts that people overweight information that is consistent
with their priors and discount information that goes against them. Whereas this could explain the updating pattern
observed in GF+I, confirmation bias is unable to explain why the pattern is different in GF, because the priors are
similar in both conditions. On the other hand, the outcome dependency present in the GF+I and GF treatments
meant that participants in these treatments had some stake in the outcome about which beliefs were elicited, whereas
this was not the case in C. “Wishful thinking” may induce them to place a higher probability on the outcome “my
in-group scored higher than the out-group” (Mayraz, 2011). This could explain why prior beliefs in GF+I and GF are
higher than in C, but it cannot explain why posterior beliefs in GF converge faster than beliefs in GF+I. Moreover,
the results by Barron (2016) and Gotthard-Real (2017) indicate that outcome desirability (without ego-relevance) is
by itself not strong enough to lead to asymmetric belief updating. Finally, the outcome dependency could also have
affected beliefs by triggering reciprocity considerations.
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Figure 3: Counterfactual beliefs in GF+I vs. observed beliefs in GF+I and C
The Figure plots average beliefs about the probability that the in-group scored higher than the out-group in the
IQ test before and after the realisation of the signals. µ0 is the prior belief and µt is the posterior belief after the
realisation of the t-th signal. The dash-dotted line represents the counterfactual beliefs of participants in GF+I. We
computed these as the posterior belief that, given their priors, participants in GF+I would have if they updated
beliefs like participants in C. The solid line represents observed beliefs in GF+I and the dashed line observed beliefs
in C.
on negative information. This dynamic bias counteracts the effect of the two forces that should473
reduce in-group overconfidence over time: namely, i) learning and ii) the deterioration in group474
identification and attachment as decisions take place at later times after the group manipulation475
tasks.22 While learning should eventually erase initial differences in prior beliefs, asymmetric476
updating reduces the speed at which it does. Moreover, if signals arrive at a low pace or not at all,477
e.g., if the counter-factual is not observable as in hiring decisions, the prior in-group bias could be478
perpetuated.479
The effects we show in our experiment are important because biased beliefs about group-level480
ability can have critical consequences when statistical discrimination based on group membership481
occurs, and people make forecasts about an individual’s performance using group membership as482
additional information. Economic models of statistical discrimination usually assume that beliefs483
about group-level ability are rationally formed to maximize their instrumental value, and that they484
are therefore on average correct (e.g., Phelps, 1972; Arrow, 1973; Aigner & Cain, 1977; Coate &485
Loury, 1993). By showing that such beliefs may be systematically distorted in an in-group favoring486
way, our results shed doubt on this assumption. This means, for instance, that employers who487
belong to and identify with a certain social group, may systematically make mistakes in the way488
they infer workers’ ability based on group information.23 The discriminatory impact of such biased489
22For supporting evidence see Chen & Li (2009).
23Consider, for instance, the results by Mobius et al. (2016) who find in a field experiment in China that majority-
group employers seem to systematically underestimate the performance of minority group candidates. Similarly,
Arrow (1973) discusses that employers’ beliefs do not necessarily correspond to real differences between groups. In his
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beliefs could be further magnified if prior beliefs also affect the willingness to acquire and process490
individualized information about a candidate (“attention discrimination”, see Bartosˇ et al., 2016).491
Our results add a new angle to economic theories of discrimination and contribute to a bet-492
ter understanding of how and why discrimination occurs. From a policy making perspective this493
is important, because different mechanisms require different responses when it comes to acting494
against discrimination (Guryan & Charles, 2013). For instance, if people distort their beliefs about495
group-level characteristics systematically, policy interventions targeted at changing the fundamen-496
tals underlying these characteristics, e.g., by trying to increase human capital investments of mi-497
nority groups, may have only limited impact, and other (potentially simple) measures such as498
raising awareness of the bias (see, e.g., Pope et al., 2018) may be necessary to ensure the success499
of such policies. From a theoretical perspective, our findings could provide a building stone for a500
more nuanced economic model of discrimination, going beyond purely taste-based (Becker, 1957)501
or statistical accounts. For this purpose, models of ego-utility (Ko˝szegi, 2006) could be enriched502
by a component capturing the importance of group-level beliefs to serve as a micro-foundation for503
modeling why and how people distort beliefs about groups. This could provide interesting new504
insights for future theoretical and empirical work.505
Acknowledgments
We thank Bjo¨rn Bartling, Adrian Bruhin, Yan Chen, Florian Ederer, Claus Ghesla, Lorenz Goette,
Annette Harms, Holger Herz, Michael Kosfeld, Rafael Lalive, Arno Riedl, Dominic Rohner, Lu´ıs
Santos-Pinto, Jan Schmitz, Vera Shuman, Matthias Sutter, Henrik Zaunbrecher, Christian Zehnder,
and Ro’i Zultan, as well as seminar participants at the Universities of Bern and Lausanne, AEW
2013 in Rome, BEER 2013 in Lausanne, SMYE 2014 in Vienna, THEEM 2014 in Stein am Rhein,
the Workshop for Experimental and Behavioral Economic Research 2014 in Zurich, ASFEE 2015
in Paris, and the European Winter Meeting of the Econometric Society 2015 in Milan for valuable
comments.
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A Additional Descriptive Statistics and Analyses
Table A1: Distribution of control variables by condition
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All C GF GF+I
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Female 0.464 0.500 0.484 0.504 0.484 0.504 0.422 0.498
Age 21.021 2.589 21.578 3.351 20.719 2.250 20.766 1.883
p−valuea 0.551 0.211
IQ score 12.411 2.522 12.406 2.505 12.641 2.560 12.188 2.519
p−valuea 0.99 0.941
Risk aversionb 6.281 1.998 5.953 2.073 6.375 1.786 6.516 2.108
p−valuea 0.699 0.551
Observations 192 64 64 64
a]p-values from Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests of equality of distributions (against Control condition).
b]Self reported measure on a 0-10 scale (higher as risk aversion increases).
Table A2: Number of ties in the signal generation process
Condition Period1 Period2 Period3
Control 10 7 5
Group Framing 7 8 5
Group Framing + Interaction 6 7 11
t-test GF vs C, p-value .233 .679 1
t-test GF+I vs C, p-value .104 1 .014
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Table A3: OLS regressions for prior beliefs µ0 by IQ
(1) (2)
GF+I 5.641** 5.603**
(2.424) (2.430)
GF 5.891** 5.954**
(2.560) (2.589)
GF+I×IQ -2.073
(2.362)
GF×IQ -2.419
(3.124)
IQ score 1.684
(1.748)
Constant 54.922*** 54.925***
(1.728) (1.728)
Observations 192 192
R2 0.036 0.042
Notes: *** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.10. Robust
SE in parentheses.
GF+I=1 if participant in GF+I condi-
tion; GF=1 if participant in GF condition;
GF+I=GF=0 if participant in C condition.
IQ score measure standarized
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B Cost of Belief Distortion
In this section, we describe in more detail the implications of the belief elicitation mechanism we
used for the cost of distorting beliefs (away from the rational benchmark) to participants. Given
the design of the experiment, every group has the same probability of scoring higher than the
out-group in the IQ test and thus of “winning” the tournament (i.e., P (W ) = 0.5). Therefore, the
expected payoff of the tournament (piT ) is
E(piT ) = 10P (W ) = 5
In each time period, the individual participant reports a belief µt and the elicitation mechanism
selects a random number rt ∼ U [0, 1]24. If r ≤ µ she plays the tournament and receives the payoff
E(piT ). If r > µ she plays the lottery and receives the lottery payoff (piL), which is in expectations:
E(piL|r > µ) = 10E(r|r > µ)
= 10[.5(1 + µ)]
= 5(1 + µ)
The expected per-period payoff is thus
E(pi|µ) = E(piT )P (r ≤ µ) + E(piL|r > µ)P (r > µ)
Since r is uniformly distributed, P (r ≤ µ) = F (µ) = µ. Therefore
E(pi|µ) = E(piT )µ+ E(piL|r > µ)(1− µ)
= 5µ+ 5(1 + µ)(1− µ)
= 5(1 + µ− µ2)
It is easy to see that the per-period payoff is maximized at µ∗ = .5, which yields E(pi|µ∗) = 6.25.
Figure B1 plots the cost of belief distortion, that is the difference between biased expected payoffs
E(pi|µ) and unbiased expected payoffs E(pi|µ∗) relative to these latter. The cost function is convex:
for small departures around µ∗, the loss is rather small, whereas it increases rapidly with µ. We
can see that reporting µ = .6, for instance, represents a loss of 0.8% in expected earnings compared
to reporting µ = µ∗ = .5, while reporting µ = 1 entails a 20% loss in expected earnings.
What was the realized cost of distorting beliefs for the participants in our experiment? Table
B1 displays the average earnings (in experimental points) per period and condition. It shows that
participants in the GF+I treatment earned significantly less overall than the participants in the
control treatment. For the GF treatment, the difference is not statistically significant overall.
24For simplicity, we remove the time subscript as the per-period payoffs are independent between periods.
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Figure B1: Cost of belief distortion (proportional to unbiased expected payoff)
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Table B1: Earnings in the belief elicitation stage (in points)
Condition Period0 Period1 Period2 Period3 Total
Control 6.88 8.44 7.66 8.59 31.56
Group Framing 7.81 8.44 7.81 7.19 31.25
Group Framing + Interaction 7.03 5.47 7.50 7.03 27.03
p-value GF+I < C .575 <.001 .419 .016 .025
p-value GF < C .883 .500 .583 .026 .440
Note: one-sided p-values from difference-in-means t-tests with equal variances.
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C Checking for Private Information
To ensure that participants could make no reliable inference about group intelligence before we
measured their prior beliefs, and that decisions are independent (not correlated within groups) in
GF + I, we check that participants in this condition could not infer their in-group’s intelligence by
seeing the in- and the out-group’s flag on their screens or by observing the size of their own group’s
circles at the end of the circle tasks in stage A.
C.1 Flags
Figure C1 shows the group flags constructed by the participants in GF+I. The flags right next
to each other are the flags of the groups that were in competition with each other in stage A of
the experiment. In order to test whether it is possible to infer a group’s intelligence from these
flags, we presented the eight pairs of flags to an additional sample of 45 student participants, and
asked them, based on the flags only, to guess which of the two groups they believed scored higher
on an intelligence test. Participants were not incentivised in this follow-up study. On average,
these 45 additional participants guessed correctly 55 percent of the time. This is only marginally
significantly different from a chance level of 50 percent (p = .060).25 On the level of the individual
comparisons, participants guessed significantly correctly for comparisons 2.b, 3.a, and 3.b. They
were significantly wrong for comparison 1.b.26
For each group, we compute a variable “flag-score” equal to the proportion of “won the tourna-
ment” guesses among the 45 participants in the additional sample. In other words, the flag-score
of the group is the probability (assigned by participants in the additional sample) that the group
scored higher than the other group in the IQ test.
Figure C2 does not show an evident relationship between the individual prior beliefs of par-
ticipants in the experiment and the in-group’s flag-score. The regressions in Table C1 further
corroborate this statement. Columns 1 and 2 show OLS estimates of parameters in a regression of
prior beliefs on the flag-score of the group, with and without control variables. Columns 3 and 4
use as regressor a binary variable that equals 1 when the flag-score is above .5. In none of these
specifications there appears to be a significant effect of the flag-score on prior beliefs.
Overall, we interpret this as evidence that it is not possible to reliably infer group intelligence
from seeing the flags that the two groups constructed in stage A.
C.2 Circles
Figure C3 plots the in-group’s score in the IQ test (excluding the self) against the final size of the
in-group’s circle (at the end of the clicking game), for the two clicking games of stage A. In none
25p-value from OLS regression clustered by individual. A non-clustered binomial probability test yields a p-value
of p = .065.
26For comparison 1.b 82.2 percent guessed falsely that the green group was more intelligent; for 2.b 71.1 percent
guessed correctly that the yellow group was more intelligent; for 3.a 82.2 percent guessed correctly that the red group
was more intelligent, and for 3.b 71.1 percent guessed correctly that the green group was more intelligent.
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of the two games there seems to be a correlation between the size of the circles and the in-group’s
score in the IQ test. If any, there is a positive one in the circle-reduce game, though the slope
coefficient is clearly not significant (t = 0.51, p > .10).
The lack of correlation between the outcome of the circle tasks and the groups’ scores on the IQ
test, plus the fact that intelligence cannot be reliably inferred from observing the flags, allow us to
rule out within-group correlation in the elicitation of beliefs as a result of the group manipulation
tasks in stage A. Moreover, participants do not get any feedback about the outcomes of the games
of stage A: they do not know if they won against the other group in the circle tasks and they
do not know how they scored in the IQ test individually nor at the group level. Hence, when
we elicit priors, their decisions can be considered as independent. When eliciting posteriors, they
are only informed about whether their group scored better or not than the other group at three
randomly drawn questions. They do not see the other participants’ beliefs, nor their scores, nor
their signals. Thus, also for GF+I, we can consider the individual participant as the independent
level of observation, and we do therefore not cluster standard errors on the group-level in the
regression analyses presented in the results section of the paper.27
Table C1: OLS regressions for prior beliefs µ0 by flag-score of group
(1) (2) (3) (4)
flag-score 1.016 3.532
(8.475) (9.113)
female 4.213 4.352
(3.003) (2.722)
age -0.733 -0.787
(1.594) (1.539)
IQ score -0.497 -0.407
(1.925) (2.039)
risk aversion 1.515 1.565
(1.477) (1.447)
high flag-score 0.875 1.988
(3.812) (3.987)
Constant 60.054*** 56.725*** 60.125*** 57.435***
(5.201) (6.189) (3.445) (3.997)
Observations 64 64 64 64
R2 0.000 0.038 0.001 0.041
Notes: *** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.10. SE clustered by group in parentheses.
High flag-score = 1 if flag-score> .5.
age, IQ score and Risk averion measures standarized.
27For the C and GF conditions clustering is evidently not necessary, as participants did not engage in any of the
interactive group tasks of stage A.
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Figure C1: Flags constructed by participants in GF+I
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D In-group Overconfidence vs. Individual Overconfidence
Figure D1 plots the subjective prior belief that the in-group scored higher than the out-group
in the IQ test, i.e., µ0 (elicited in stage C of the experiment) against the measure of individual
overconfidence (elicited in stage E), by condition. Albeit positive, the relationship between these
two measures is not statistically significant in GF+I (t = 1.34, p > 0.1). It is significant in the other
conditions (t = 2.01 p = .049 in C and t = 2.12, p = .038 in GF). The fact that the correlation is
significant in the Control condition, but non-significant in our main treatment condition (GF+I)
means that individual self-confidence is unlikely to be the driver behind the treatment differences
we find (specifically that prior beliefs about group performance are higher in GF+I than in C). It
does not seem to be the case that overconfidence in one’s group and overconfidence in the self are
strongly related. The small positive correlations we find in two of our three treatments may be
driven by anchoring effects (when entering their choice regarding confidence in the self in stage E,
participants may remember their earlier decisions about confidence in the group in stages C and D of
the experiment, and use them as an anchor) or also by some individuals consistently misinterpreting
the belief elicitation mechanism. By comparing the results from our GF+I condition with C, our
design allows taking such potential misunderstandings of the belief elicitation mechanism into
account and prevents them from biasing our results.
Another possibility is that information and beliefs about group performance affect beliefs about
individual performance (i.e., an effect in the opposite direction than the one discussed above).
Specifically, participants could interpret the signals they received about group performance as
informative about themselves. Even though with perfectly rational information processing, this
should not happen (as the signals contained only information about the performance of the other
group members and not about the self), it is possible that identification with the group actually
drives such an effect.
To analyze the relationship between individual overconfidence and the signals across the treat-
ment conditions, we computed the number of good signals each participant observed. In Figure D2
below we plot the belief about own performance in the IQ test against the number of good signals
observed. There appears to be a positive relationship in the GF and GF+I conditions, but the
confidence intervals overlap, suggesting it is not significant.
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E Econometric Model of Belief Updating
To identify a potential in-group bias in the way participants process information, we begin by
considering the Bayesian posterior belief
µt ≡ P (W |st, ..., s1) = P (st|W, st−1, ..., s1)
P (st|st−1, ..., s1) µt−1 (4)
where W (for “winning”) is the event “the in-group scored higher than the out-group in the IQ
test” and s is the signal received about relative performance of the in-group. Let pt denote the
informativeness of a good signal, i.e. pt = P (st = G|W, st−1, ..., s1) = 1−P (st = G|L, st−1, ..., s1),28
where L (for “losing”) is the event “the in-group scored lower than the out-group in the IQ test.”
For good and bad signals, the likelihood ratios of posteriors are
µGt
1− µGt
=
P (W |st = G, st−1, ..., s1)
P (L|st = G, st−1, ..., s1) =
pt
(1− pt)
µt−1
1− µt−1
µBt
1− µBt
=
P (W |st = B, st−1, ..., s1)
P (L|st = B, st−1, ..., s1) =
(1− pt)
pt
µt−1
1− µt−1
Taking logs and combining these two equations we can write the posterior odds as
ln
(
µt
1− µt
)
= ln
(
pt
1− pt
)
1(st = G) + ln
(
1− pt
pt
)
1(st = B) + ln
(
µt−1
1− µt−1
)
with 1(st = S) an indicator that takes value one if the signal is S. Allowing all coefficients to differ
between conditions according to the indicators GF + Ii = 1 if participant i is in GF+I, GFi = 1 if
participant i is in GF, and GF + Ii = GFi = 0 if she is in C, we arrive at regression model (1).
Before estimating the parameters in model (1) we computed the empirical informativeness (pt)
of the signals received by participants in the experiment. For the first period, we drew 2024 signals
by selecting each possible triplet out of the 24 questions in the IQ test and comparing the scores
of each group; p1 is equal to the proportion of positive signals among the “winning” groups (i.e.,
groups that scored higher overall than their out-group). For period two, we eliminated the actual
questions that were drawn in the first signal and considered the remaining 21 questions in the test;
we computed p2 as the proportion of positive signals among the “winning” groups conditional on
the realized first signal. Finally, we eliminated the questions drawn in the second signal and drew
all possible third signals from the remaining 18 questions and computed p3, again conditional on
the history of signals.29
28Notice that this equality is given by experimental design.
29We do not claim that participants were able to perfectly infer the informativeness of the signal. However, our
analysis does not aim at judging the descriptive validity of Bayesian updating (for this see, e.g., Tversky & Kahneman,
1974, and the discussion in Mobius et al., 2014). Rather, our aim is to isolate a potential in-group bias by comparing
updating behavior in GF+I with updating in C, and by comparing reactions to positive and negative signals.
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F Clustering Standard Errors by Group
This section presents additional results for readers that are not convinced by the argument regarding
clustering in Appendix C .
In tables F1 and F2 below we reproduce respectively our main tables 3 and 5, but showing
standard errors clustered by group.
Indeed, the results are robust to clustering at the group level for all parameters except αB1
that loses its marginal significance. This is not problematic as the significance of αG1 still implies
that participants in the GF+I condition update asymmetrically with respect to participants in the
Control condition.
Table F1: OLS regressions for µ0
(1) (2)
GF+I 5.641** 5.700**
(2.660) (2.731)
GF 5.891** 5.803**
(2.654) (2.613)
female 2.457
(2.086)
age 0.399
(1.009)
IQ score 0.354
(1.171)
risk aversion 0.888
(0.876)
Constant 54.922*** 53.793***
(1.898) (2.422)
Observations 192 192
Groups 48 48
R2 0.036 0.047
Notes: *** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.10. SE clus-
tered by group in parentheses.
GF+I=1 if participant in GF+I condi-
tion; GF=1 if participant in GF condition;
GF+I=GF=0 if participant in C condition.
age, IQ score and risk aversion standardized.
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Table F2: OLS regressions for µ˜it ≡ ln[µit/(1− µit)]
(1) (2) (3) (4)
αG0 : Good signal 1.047*** 1.139*** 0.455 0.595*
(0.222) (0.219) (0.315) (0.302)
αB0 : Bad signal 0.927*** 0.783*** 1.409*** 1.148***
(0.233) (0.238) (0.463) (0.425)
β0: Lagged belief 0.382*** 0.363*** 0.372*** 0.343***
(0.108) (0.109) (0.101) (0.097)
αG1 : Good signal × GF+I 0.918** 0.832**
(0.426) (0.396)
αB1 : Bad signal × GF+I -0.827 -0.653
(0.539) (0.506)
β1: Lagged belief 0.021 0.040
(0.233) (0.230)
αG2 : Good signal × GF 0.854 0.827
(0.662) (0.647)
αB2 : Bad signal × GF -0.593 -0.424
(0.666) (0.651)
β2: Lagged belief -0.039 -0.012
(0.237) (0.240)
female -0.097 -0.108
(0.109) (0.111)
age -0.099** -0.079
(0.043) (0.048)
IQ score 0.003 0.001
(0.042) (0.040)
risk aversion 0.122*** 0.104***
(0.038) (0.036)
Observations 489 489 489 489
Groups 48 48 48 48
R2 0.212 0.226 0.227 0.237
Notes: *** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.10. SE clustered by group in parentheses.
Observations with extreme current or lagged beliefs are dropped from the estimations
because µ˜ is not defined when µ = 0 or µ = 1.
age, IQ score and risk aversion standardized.
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G Instrumental Variables Estimation
In section 3.1 we discuss the group identification measure we elicited in the post-experimental
survey. This measure is likely endogenous in a reduced-form specification. One reason is that
it is measured after beliefs, i.e. the dependent variable, and hence may be affected by the way
participants updated their beliefs producing reverse causality. Since participants were randomly
assigned to conditions with different levels of induced group identification, we can use treatment
assignment as an instrument for the group identification measure.
In Table G1, we estimate the model for prior beliefs by two-stage least-squares (2SLS), instru-
menting the group identification measure with two dummies for treatment assignment, GF+I and
GF, both equal to zero for the Control condition. The first stage regression (with and without
further control variables) shows a weak effect of treatment assignment on group identification, as
suggested by the F-statistics on the excluded instruments. The second stage shows a strong positive
effect of group identification on prior beliefs: a one standard deviation increase in identification
leads to a 9 percentage points increase in reported prior beliefs.
Table G1: IV regressions for µ0
(1) (2)
Group identification 8.550** 9.239**
(3.748) (4.167)
female 3.326
(2.308)
age 0.970
(1.227)
IQ score 0.745
(1.157)
risk aversion 0.181
(1.257)
Constant 58.766*** 57.224***
(1.113) (1.551)
Observations 192 192
F-stat 1st stage 9.143 7.498
Notes: *** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.10. Robust SE in
parentheses.
Group identification = self-reported level of identifica-
tion to the ingroup (1-10 scale) standardized.
age, IQ score and risk aversion standardized based on
original scales.
In Table G2, we instrument the three group identification interactions (with good signal, bad
signal and lagged beliefs) with the six treatment assignment interactions (two dummies for GF+I
and GF, interacted with good signal, bad signal and lagged beliefs), and regress posterior beliefs
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Table G2: IV regressions for µ˜it ≡ ln[µit/(1− µit)]
(1) (2)
Good signal 0.820*** 0.929***
(0.295) (0.296)
Bad signal 0.753*** 0.668**
(0.231) (0.259)
Lagged belief 0.257** 0.251*
(0.125) (0.129)
Good signal × Group identif. 1.596* 1.425*
(0.927) (0.863)
Bad signal × Group identif. -1.728 -1.573
(1.111) (1.256)
Lagged belief× Group identif. 0.003 0.032
(0.269) (0.270)
female -0.093
(0.136)
age -0.063
(0.063)
IQ score 0.062
(0.087)
risk aversion 0.075
(0.060)
Observations 489 489
Participants 173 173
F-stat 1st stage (good signal) 2.31 2.27
F-stat 1st stage (bad signal) 1.58 0.88
F-stat 1st stage (lagged belief) 2.02 2.03
Notes: *** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.10. SE clustered by participant
in parentheses.
Group identification = self-reported level of identification to the
ingroup (1-10 scale) standardized.
Group identification instrumented with condition dummies GF+I
and GF.
Observations with extreme current or lagged beliefs are dropped
from the estimations because µ˜ is not defined when µ = 0 or µ = 1.
age, IQ score and risk aversion standardized.
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on it. The F-statistics from the first stage regressions (with and without further control variables)
show evidence that the instruments are very weak. The second stage shows that one standard
deviation increase in group-identification leads to stronger reaction to positive information, that
is αG1 > 0 (p = .085), but no differential reaction to negative information; α
B
1 = 0 (p = .120).
However, there is evidence of asymmetric updating of beliefs: a one standard deviation increase
in group identification leads participants to put more weight on positive signals about the group
than they put on negative signals (αG0 +α
G
1 > α
B
0 +α
B
1 , p = .022). When adding control variables,
the significance of the α-coefficients vanishes (p = .101 and p = .159 for good and bad signals
respectively), but there is still evidence of asymmetric updating (p = .022).
The IV estimation strategy is unreliable for the two reasons mentioned above: the group iden-
tification measure suffers from measurement error, and treatment assignment is a weak instrument
for it.
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H Experimental Instructions
(The following instructions were originally in French.)
Welcome to this experiment! You will make decisions that will affect your earnings. Although we
express all earnings in terms of coins, these coins will be exchanged for swiss francs at the end of
the experiment using the following exchange rate:
5 coins = CHF 1.-
Independently from your decisions during the experiment, you will receive a fix amount of 8
CHF for your participation. The final amounts will be rounded to the nearest integer.
It is strictly forbidden to talk with other participants. It is important that you respect
this rule for the experiment to run smoothly. If you have any questions, please raise your hand
to contact the assistants. If you do not follow this rule, we will have to exclude you from the
experiment.
H.1 Control condition
The following part was contained in the instructions distributed to participants in the Control con-
dition.
This experiment is divided in three parts (A, B and C). We will now explain what you will do
in the first part (part A).
PART A
What is it about? You will do a test of logic based on images. Your objective is to answer
correctly as many questions as possible.
What will you do? The test is composed of 3 sections. Each section of the test will be described
in detail directly on the screen at the beginning of each section. We will also provide you with
examples of the type of questions contained in the section. Each section is composed of 8 questions.
There are thus a total of 24 questions in the test. You have 1 minute 30 seconds per section to
answer as many questions as possible. For every correct answer, one point will be added to your
score. If your score places you among the 50% best participants in the room, you earn a prize of
10 coins. In case of a tie, the computer will determine randomly who earns the prize.
Be aware that certain questions, towards the end of each section, are very difficult and almost
nobody can expect to answer them on time. Even if you ignore the right answer, try and guess,
because an empty answer is considered as false.
You will be informed of your earnings in this part at the end of the experiment.
Did you understand? At the beginning of each section, you will be able to practice with two
trial questions. The answer to these questions will not influence your score.
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PART B
What is it about? In this 4-section part, we propose you two games, game A and game B. Your
single task is to fix a rule that determines which game you will play.
Game A is a comparison game, that consists in comparing the score in the image test of part
A (“the test”) obtained by three randomly-selected participants in the room with the score of three
other randomly-selected participants in the room. For ease of explanation, we will refer to the first
three participants as “persons X,Y,Z” and the other three participants as “persons A,B,C.” Notice
that you are not included among these six persons.
Game B is a lottery game, whose rules are explained below.
What will you do?
Section 1: The two games are explained in the table below:
Game A: comparison game Game B: lottery game
If the persons XYZ have obtained
MORE points in total in the image test
of part A than persons ABC, you earn
10 coins.
A random device in the computer will
determine if you earn the 10 coins or if
you earn 0 coins.
If the persons XYZ have obtained
LESS points in total in the image test
of part A than persons ABC, you earn
0 coins.
The probability of earning the 10 coins
is X% (see explanation below).
If XYZ and ABC have obtained the
same number of points in the test, the
computer will toss a coin to determine
who has “obtained” more points.
Game B offers the possibility of earning 10 coins with a probability already determined by the
computer (a value between 0 and 100%, that we call here X%). What does this mean? If X is equal
to 0%, for exemple, it means that you have no chance of winning in game B. On the contrary, if X
is equal to 100%,you will systematically win in game B.
You don’t know what is exactly the probability X of winning the 10 coins in the lottery game
B, so how to chose which game you prefer to play? Actually, you will fix the rule that determines
which game you will play, by telling us a value between 0 and 100%. The rule is:
• If the probability X determined by the computer is lower or equal to the value that you tell
us, you play game A.
• If the probability X determined by the computer is greater than the value that you tell us,
you play game B.
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• To sum up, the rule is:
X ≤ value that you tell us → game A
X > value that you tell us → game B
In other words, you will tell us from which value of the probability X of winning in game
B, you prefer to play game B rather than game A.
Please, look at the examples in the table below to better understand the consequences of your
decision.
Probability X
(determined by
the computer)
Value that you
tell us
You play
25% 20% Game B: you earn 10 coins with a 25%
probability
25% 30% Game A: you earn 10 coins if the score of
XYZ in the images test is higher than the
score of ABC
75% 30% Game B: you earn 10 coins with a 75%
probability
75% 40% Game B: you earn 10 coins with a 75%
probability
75% 90% Game A: you earn 10 coins if the score of
XYZ in the images test is higher than the
score of ABC
These examples show you that, if you want to maximize your chances of earning the 10 coins,
you have to think carefully and tell us from which value of the probability X of winning in the
lottery game you really prefer to play game B rather than game A.
The following figure shows you the screen where you will tell us this value. After having entered
your value click on the button “continue”.
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Section 2: This section is almost identical to the previous one. However, in the beginning of
this section, the computer will inform you of the outcome of a “match” between ABC and XYZ.
To determine the outcome of the “match,” the computer will randomly draw three out of the
24 questions of the image test of part B and will compute the number of points obtained in total
at these three questions by persons ABC and persons XYZ. The three persons that have obtained
the most points in these three questions win the “match.” If ABC and XYZ have obtained the
same number of points, the computer will toss a coin to determine who wins the “match.” You will
see whether XYZ have WON or LOST the match on top of your screen. After having learned the
outcome of the match, you will tell us, just like in Section 1, from which value of the probability
X, you prefer to play game B rather than game A.
Sections 3 and 4: These sections are identical to Section 2. Just like in Section 2, in the
beginning of theses sections the computer will inform you of the outcome of a “match” between
ABC and XYZ. For every match the computer will consider the answers to three out of the 24
questions of the test. However, the three questions drawn randomly by the computer are different
from the ones drawn in the previous matchs. The answers to a question are thus never part of more
than one match.
Also in sections 3 and 4, after having learned the outcome of the match, you will tell us from
which value of the probability X, you prefer to play game B rather than game A.
You will be informed of your earnings in this part at the end of the experiment.
Did you understand? Before starting, we want to make sure that you and everybody else have
understood correctly what you will do. For this purpose, please answer the control questions that
will appear on your screen. These questions have no influence on your earnings.
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PART C
What is it about? In this part, we will propose you two games: game A and game B. Just like
in part B, you will fix the rule that determines which game you will play.
Game A is a ranking game, where you earn coins if the total number of points that you have
obtained in the image test of part A (your individual score) places you among the best 50% of
participants in the room in terms of this score.
Game B is a lottery game, identical to the one in part B.
What will you do? We will classify the individual scores of each of the 16 participants in this
room in two halfs: the top 50% (the 8 highest scores) and the bottom 50% (the 8 lowest scores).
In the table below we explain the two games:
Game A: ranking game Game B: lottery game
If your individual score places you
among the top 50% in the room, you
earn 10 coins.
A random device in the computer will
determine if you earn the 10 coins or if
you earn 0 coins.
If your individual score places you
among the bottom 50% in the room,
you earn 0 coins.
The probability of earning the 10 coins
is X% (see explanation below).
If your score is right in the middle, the
computer will toss a coin to determine
if your score is among the top or among
the bottom 50%.
Just like before, you will tell us from which value of the probability X of winning at the lottery
game, you prefer to play game B, rather than game A. Once you have entered your value, click on
the button “continue.”
Your earnings will be computed in the same way as in part B. You will be informed of these
earnings at the end of the experiment.
Did you understand? If you have finished reading these instructions and you have no questions,
click on “start”. If you have questions, raise your hand to call one of the assistants.
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H.2 Group Framing condition
The following part was contained in the instructions distributed to participants in the Group Framing
condition.
In this study, each participant is part of a group composed of four participants. Your group
will always be the same throughout the entire experiment.
This experiment is divided in three parts (A, B and C). We will now explain what you will do
in the first part (part A).
PART A
What is it about? Your group is related to another group in the room. You will do a test of
logic based on images. The objective of your group is to obtain a score in the test higher than the
other group.
What will you do? The test is composed of 3 sections. Each section of the test will be described
in detail directly on the screen at the beginning of each section. We will also provide you with
examples of the type of questions contained in the section. Each section is composed of 8 questions.
There are thus a total of 24 questions in the test. You have 1 minute 30 seconds per section to
answer as many questions as possible. For every correct answer, one point will be added to your
group’s score. The group with the highest score in the test earns a prize of 10 coins for each group
member. The members of the losing group do not earn anything. In case of a tie, the computer
will determine randomly who earns the prize.
Be aware that certain questions, towards the end of each section, are very difficult and almost
nobody can expect to answer them on time. Even if you ignore the right answer, try and guess,
because an empty answer is considered as false.
You will be informed of your earnings in this part at the end of the experiment.
Did you understand? At the beginning of each section, you will be able to practice with two
trial questions. The answer to these questions will not influence your score.
PART B
What is it about? In this 4-section part, we propose you two games, game A and game B. Your
single task is to fix a rule that determines which game you will play.
Game A is a comparison game, that consists in comparing the score in the image test of part
A (“the test”) obtained by the three other members of your group (“your group”) with the total
score of three members of the other group (“the other group”). The three members of the other
group that will be considered for the score comparison have been randomly chosen among the four
members of the other group. These three members of the other group will always be the same
persons until the end of the experiment.
Game B is a lottery game, whose rules are explained below.
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What will you do?
Section 1: The two games are explained in the table below:
Game A: comparison game Game B: lottery game
If your group has obtained MORE
points in total in the image test of part
A than the other group, you earn 10
coins.
A random device in the computer will
determine if you earn the 10 coins or if
you earn 0 coins.
If your group has obtained LESS
points in total in the image test of part
A than the other group, you earn 0
coins.
The probability of earning the 10 coins
is X% (see explanation below).
If your group and the other group have
obtained the same number of points in
the test, the computer will randomly
determine which group has “obtained”
more points.
Game B offers the possibility of earning 10 coins with a probability already determined by the
computer (a value between 0 and 100%, that we call here X%). What does it mean? If X is equal
to 0%, for exemple, it means that you have no chance of winning in game B. On the contrary, if X
is equal to 100%,you will systematically win in game B.
You don’t know what is exactly the probability X of winning the 10 coins in the lottery game
B, so how to chose which game you prefer to play? Actually, you will fix the rule that determines
which game you will play, by telling us a value between 0 and 100%. The rule is:
• If the probability X determined by the computer is lower or equal to the value that you tell
us, you play game A.
• If the probability X determined by the computer is greater than the value that you tell us,
you play game B.
• To sum up, the rule is:
X ≤ value that you tell us → game A
X > value that you tell us → game B
In other words, you will tell us from which value of the probability X of winning in game
B, you prefer to play game B rather than game A.
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Please, look at the examples in the table below to better understand the consequences of your
decision.
Probability X
(determined by
the computer)
Value that you
tell us
You play
25% 20% Game B: you earn 10 coins with a 25%
probability
25% 30% Game A: you earn 10 coins if the score
of your group in the images test is higher
than the score of the other group
75% 30% Game B: you earn 10 coins with a 75%
probability
75% 40% Game B: you earn 10 coins with a 75%
probability
75% 90% Game A: you earn 10 coins if the score
of your group in the images test is higher
than the score of the other group
These examples show you that, if you want to maximize your chances of earning the 10 coins,
you have to think carefully and tell us from which value of the probability X of winning in the
lottery game you really prefer to play game B rather than game A.
The following figure shows you the screen where you will tell us this value. After having entered
your value click on the button “continue”.
Section 2: This section is almost identical to the previous one. However, in the beginning of
this section, the computer will inform you of the outcome of a “match” between the two groups.
To determine the outcome of the “match,” the computer will randomly draw three out of the
24 questions of the image test of part B and will compute the number of points obtained in total at
these three questions by the three members of your group and by the three members of the other
group. The group that has obtained the most points in these three questions wins the “match.” If
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the two groups have obtained the same number of points, the computer will toss a coin to determine
which group wins the “match.” You will see whether your group has WON or LOST the match
on top of your screen. After having learned the outcome of the match, you will tell us, just like in
Section 1, from which value of the probability X, you prefer to play game B rather than game A.
Sections 3 and 4: These sections are identical to Section 2. Just like in Section 2, in the
beginning of theses sections the computer will inform you of the outcome of a “match” between
the two groups. For every match the computer will consider the answers to three out of the 24
questions of the test. However, the three questions drawn randomly by the computer are different
from the ones drawn in the previous matchs. The answers to a question are thus never part of more
than one match.
Also in sections 3 and 4, after having learned the outcome of the match, you will tell us from
which value of the probability X, you prefer to play game B rather than game A.
You will be informed of your earnings in this part at the end of the experiment.
Did you understand? Before starting, we want to make sure that you and everybody else have
understood correctly what you will do. For this purpose, please answer the control questions that
will appear on your screen. These questions have no influence on your earnings.
PART C
(This part is identical in all conditions. Refer to subsection G.1, Part C, for instructions)
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H.3 Group Framing + Interaction condition
The following part was contained in the instructions distributed to participants in the Group Framing
+ Interaction condition.
In this study, each participant is part of a group composed of four participants. Your group
will always be the same throughout the entire experiment.
This experiment is divided in seven parts (A to G). We will now explain what you will do in
the first part (part A).
PART A
What is it about? In this part, the other members of your group and yourself will construct
the flag that will represent you throughout the experiment. For this purpose, each of you will be
in charge of decorating one of the fours corners of the flag using colored paper (each group has a
different color). In other words, the flag of your group will be composed of a representative element
of each one of you.
What will you do? On your table, in front of you, you will find a pair of scissors and an envelope
containing colored paper. Start by cutting out a shape. You are free to cut out any shape you
want, but you cannot cut out words, nor can you write on the shape. The shape must be composed
of a single element (you cannot cut out two separate shapes).
When you finish, write your place number on the back of the shape and put it inside the envelope.
After 5 minutes, the assistants will collect the envelopes containing the shapes. They will then
paste the shapes on the corners of the flag. You will see what the flag of your group looks like in
the next part of the experiment.
You can now open the envelope and start working.
PART B
What is it about? From now on, your group is related to another group in the room. You will
take part in a series of group games. The objective of your group is to win against the other group
in each of these games.
What will you do? Firstly, the flag of your group that you have just created in part A will
appear on your screen. After having seen your flag, click on “OK” so that the first game can start.
Game 1: reducing the size of circles
You and the other members of your group will see in the middle of your screen a very big circle.
The members of the other group will see a circle of the same size on their screens. The aim of the
game is to reduce the size of the circle . To reduce the size of the circle you just have to click on
it. Every click of a member of your group reduces the size of the circle. The game is over after 30
seconds. The group that finishes with the smallest circle, wins the game, and each member of the
winning group earns a reward of 10 coins. The members of the losing group do not earn anything.
In case of a tie, the computer will toss a coin to determine which group earns the reward.
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Game 2: image test
The second group game consists of a logic test based on images. The test is composed of 3
sections. Each section of the test will be described in detail directly on the screen at the beginning
of each section. We will also provide you with examples of the type of questions contained in the
section. Each section is composed of 8 questions. There are thus a total of 24 questions in the
test. You have 1 minute 30 seconds per section to answer as many questions as possible. For every
correct answer, one point will be added to your group’s score. The group with the highest score in
the test earns a prize of 10 coins for each group member. The members of the losing group do not
earn anything. In case of a tie, the computer will determine randomly who earns the prize.
Be aware that certain questions, towards the end of each section, are very difficult and almost
nobody can expect to answer them on time. Even if you ignore the right answer, try and guess,
because an empty answer is considered as false.
At the beginning of each section, you will be able to practice with two trial questions. The
answer to these questions will not influence your score.
Game 3: enlarging the size of circles
In this game, you and the other members of your group will see in the middle of your screen
a small circle. The members of the other group will see a circle of the same size on their screens.
The aim of the game is to enlarge the circle. To enlarge the circle you just have to click on it.
Every click of a member of your group enlarges the circle. You will notice that the circle will move
around the screen. You will have to carefully target the moving circle to be able to enlarge it. The
game is over after 30 seconds. The group that finishes with the largest circle, wins the game, and
each member of the winning group earns a reward of 10 coins. The members of the losing group do
not earn anything. In case of a tie, the computer will toss a coin to determine which group earns
the reward.
You will be informed of your earnings in this part at the end of the experiment.
PART C
(This part is identical to part B of the Group Framing condition. Refer to subsection G.2, Part
B, for instructions.)
PART F
(This part is identical to part C of the Control and Group Framing conditions. Refer to subsec-
tion G.1, Part C, for instructions.)
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